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When memory became portable in the course of evolution, the information 
content of memory became replicable as memes. Propagation of memes started 
with imitation, but with the advent of human language, memes thrived and 
caused enhanced brain capacity for meme processing through cognition. Cul-
ture comprises of endemic memes that enter young brains and may be protec-
tive or pathogenic. Childhood nurturance and stress enter the brain as memes 
and cause epigenetic changes in genes for future resilience or vulnerability. 
Personal development is the process of  interaction among the epigenetically 
determined brain, resident memes, and newly introduced memes. The selfplex, 
the sense of self, represents a dominant memeplex formed through develop-
ment, and consists of several memeplexes usually known as roles. In certain 
persons, there may be conflicting selfplexes, one dominant and the other(s) 
repressed. Mental health is attained when there is a memetic democracy, where 
the selfplexes are tolerated, and may shift and adapt. Stress attenuates resident 
memes including selfplex and introduces stress memes that may awaken/
strengthen repressed memes, resulting in a memetic anarchy and a final com-
mon pathway psychiatric syndrome. Treatment of such syndromes should be 
geared toward both the brain state and suppression of pathologic memes. Broad 
spectrum and specific meme-directed therapies should be considered.
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1. When Memory Became Portable, Memes Rose
Cognition, a derivative of the Latin, cognescere, meaning knowing, was 
implicitly present with the earliest forms of life, when the unicellular organ-
ism showed the ability to “know” food by ingesting it, and “know” to fol-
low chemical traces toward food. This type of “knowing” presupposes some 
type of pre-existing memory, be it learned or programmed in the DNA (or 
RNA). 
In the course of evolution, specialized structures developed that connect 
the programmed memory to learned memory, and learned memory to each 
other, which we call the nervous system. The brain evolved as a specialized 
organ dedicated to processing memory, both learned and intrinsic (DNA), 
which in turn facilitated learning, survival, reproduction, and further 
enlargement of the brain. Learning through trial and error created memories 
that facilitated individual and species survival, and resulted in building big-
ger brains, but the memories themselves died with the organism until the 
brain developed imitation as a learning tool. 
With imitation, which is robustly in evidence in primates and in song-
birds (Goodall, 1964; Haesler, Rochefort, Georgi, et al, 2007; Heyes, 1998; 
Heyes & Galef, 1996; Pinaud & Terleph, 2008; Premack & Premack, 1994; 
Sugiyama, 1995), learned behavior (memory) could be transferred from one 
brain to other brains in the form of memes. The term, meme, was coined by 
Dawkins(Dawkins, 1976; Dawkins, 2006), who proposed the term to denote 
information that is replicated through imitation. Memes have been elabo-
rated by Blackmore, Dennett, and others, and there is considerable contro-
versy concerning exactly what memes are (Aunger, 2000; Aunger, 2002; 
Blackmore, 1999; Bloch, 2000; Boyd & Richerson, 2000; Crofts, 2007; 
Distin, 2005; Gleick, 2011; Kronfeldner, 2011; Kuper, 2000; Leigh, 2011; 
Leland & Odling-Smee, 2000; Sperber, 2000). There are different views on 
whether the meme is information, specific neural structures, objects such 
as paintings, etc., or maybe all or none of these. I consider the meme to be 
information in a broad sense (Gleick, 2011), which can be represented (con-
tained) in neural structures, natural and man-made objects, electronic codes, 
etc. Inherent in the term, meme, is the implication that the information is 
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replicable. For a comprehensive discussion on the nature and usefulness of 
memes, see Blackmore (Blackmore, 2010). The purpose of this paper is not 
so much to review controversies in memetics but to show how the concept 
may be fruitfully applied to mental health and illness.
In biologic terms, meme is portable memory, or brain state that can be 
communicated. Memes are whatever can be communicated, and therefore 
reproducible, however inexactly, in another information processing entity, 
usually the brain. This reproduction need not occur immediately, the memes 
may lie dormant in books or chiseled images on cave walls for centuries 
before they come alive again (perceived and processed) and are reproduced 
in another brain. Memes may arise autochthonously from  experience, then 
broadcast to outside. There is considerable confusion about whether memes 
are physical entities or not. Memes are physical entities to the extent that 
memes can only exist and be transmitted as physical entities, but like genes, 
what they represent may not be readily describable physically – such as 
resilience, dominance, intelligence, esthetic sense,  attractiveness, rationality, 
etc. I further submit that memes as portable memory may also contain an 
emotional component, i.e., memory of emotion. Thus, the image of a bear 
that almost attacked you is a meme, as is the fear you experienced that was 
associated with the image. And you can describe it in written language so 
that another person may share your experience, or you can verbally describe 
the scene and show facial expression that shows how you felt, which will 
be transmitted by mirror neurons to another person. The whole scene can be 
videotaped, and played to audiences who have never known you. Memes, 
like genes, are usually transmitted and replicated in combinations (some-
times called memeplexes) which tend to enhance the strength and viability 
of the combined memes.
An important aspect of the concept of memes as proposed by Dawkins is 
that memes are replicators like genes, and undergo Darwinian natural selec-
tion.(Blackmore, 2000; Blackmore, 1999; Dennett, 1995; Gleick, 2011) 
2. Co-evolution of Brain, Memes, and Language
It is well known that humans have the largest brains relative to weight 
among all animals. The brain size of early hominids up to about 2.5 million 
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ago was not much larger than present day chimpanzees, but it grew rapidly 
with the transition from Australopithecus to Homo. By about 100,000 years 
ago, human brain size achieved that of modern Homo sapiens (Blackmore, 
1999) The modern human brain volume is approximately 1,350 cm3, about 
three times the size of existing apes of comparable body size  (Bradbury, 
2005; Jerison, 1973; Sakai, Mikami, Tomonaga, et al, 2011). Clearly, from 
the point of view of pure genetic survival, such large amount of brain activ-
ity is quite unnecessary. Brain is an expensive organ to keep – it consumes 
20% of the body’s energy at rest, weighing only 2% of the body’s weight. 
To quote Steven Pinker, “Why would evolution ever have selected for sheer 
bigness of brain, that bulbous, metabolically greedy organ? Any selec-
tion on brain size itself would surely have favored the pinhead” (Pinker, 
1994). In addition to being expensive to maintain, the brain is an expensive 
organ to build, requiring much resource during early life for myelination 
and growth, more than tripling in size in the first few years. (Mahmood, 
Campbell & Wilson, 1988)  It is also a dangerous organ for reproduction as 
it is often too big for the birth canal. Cephalopelvic disproportion occurs 
in 12-13% of pregnancies (Mahmood, Campbell & Wilson, 1988; Young & 
Woodmansee, 2002)  What might be the evolutionary selection pressures 
that resulted in the large brain?
Susan Blackmore proposed that a turning point in evolution occurred with 
the advent of memes, i.e., memes changed the environment in which genes 
were selected, and that the direction of change was determined by the out-
come of memetic selection (Blackmore, 1999). She argues that genes were 
selected for bigger and bigger brains in humans because of the selective 
advantage of memes. What sets homo sapiens apart from earlier hominids 
is language (Bickerton, 1995), which is associated with increased size of 
the brain as well as the lateralization of the left side of the brain for speech. 
Memes needed much space within the brain to flourish.
Prior to the advent of language, memes were mostly memory residing 
in individual organisms and died with the organisms. Chimpanzees could 
observe a bright chimpanzee cracking a nut with a stone, and this informa-
tion could spread, but only to a limited degree. First, they had to be in visual 
contact with the bright chimpanzee, and second, the bright chimpanzee 
must engage in the behavior for the meme (how to crack a nut) to spread, 
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and this presupposes that there are nuts and stones around. If chimpanzees 
had language, one who observed the behavior could describe it even when 
there were no nuts and stones, and such a meme could spread much faster 
and wider. Such was the case with homo sapiens. Eventually, with the 
advent of language, memes could be propagated through words (which are 
themselves memes) instead of the action the words represent.
At a certain level of complexity of the brain, ideas or concepts arose. An 
idea is a meme derived from processed memes (memories), i.e., an abstract 
meme. Ideas can be communicated to another either through imitation, 
emotional expression, words, or other means of communication. For exam-
ple, an animal may cry out at the sight of a predator, and others who have 
not seen the predator may get the idea that there is danger and flee. Some 
ideas are gene-derived within an individual’s brain, others are memes from 
outside that took up residence in the individual’s brain. Ideas, as memes, 
are infectious in various forms – written words, songs, movies, DVDs, etc. 
There is some controversy in memetic circles concerning whether memes 
are physical entities or not. (Aunger, 2000; Aunger, 2002; Bloch, 2000; 
Boyd & Richerson, 2000; Kronfeldner, 2011; Kuper, 2000)
I consider memes to be information, which always exists in physical 
form, be it as enhanced neural connections in the brain or patterns of ink on 
paper. Memes are like genes in that they are physically encoded, but genes 
make sense only when expressed – i.e., as phenotypes which are subject to 
natural selection. Some confusion rises because memes, as information, are 
like both genes themselves (recipe) and phenotype (meal). Memes as phe-
notype are subject to natural selection. Memes, like genes, undergo muta-
tion and copying errors. Differently encoded memes may result in similar 
phenotype memes, and, as information, phenotypic memes, unlike genes, 
can be encoded in different language and in different media. Inherent in the 
concept of memes is that they are replicators and undergo Darwinian natu-
ral selection, both in the brain (as we will see in the next section) as well as 
outside the brain in what we call culture. While memes consist of  informa-
tion, the term, information, lacks this connotaation. 
In the process of human evolution, the brain’s capacity to contain memes 
improved and so did the pace of evolution of memes within the brain. 
There is, however, a limit to how large human brain can become given the 
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genes of mammalian evolution. Memes within one brain die with the brain. 
Memes had to find ways of sending copies outside of the brain in a reliable 
way and also to reside outside of the brain until it can infect other brains. 
With the development of written word, memes found an abode outside 
of brains. Now they could reside in patterns of indentations in clay, stone, 
and of dye on paper, and eventually as electronic signals in magnetic tapes 
and optical media. Now, more memes reside outside of human brains than 
inside them, in printed form in libraries and homes, in electronic media, and 
in digital form in computers, CDs and DVDs, and in the cloud. The acqui-
sition of language by homo sapiens was instrumental in memes’ attaining 
dominance over genes for the first time on planet earth. In fact, memes in 
the form of moral codes have suppressed gene-derived sexual drive in many 
people, and memes in the form of scientific knowledge provides humans 
with the ability to control gene propagation.
Memes are being thrust into the cosmos outside of planet earth – inten-
tionally as in the golden disk in the spacecraft Voyagers I & II which are 
speeding toward the stars, and not-so-intentionally in the form of radio 
waves containing TV and radio signals leaking outside the earth. 
3. Neural Memes and Natural Selection
How are memes actually stored in the brain? Kandel and colleagues showed 
how new experience becomes long-term memory by forming new neural 
connections (Kandel, 1979; Kandel, 2009). Such newly formed neural con-
nections, as memes, interact with existing neural connections (which may 
be themselves acquired memes, or DNA-derived memes), forming neural 
clusters with enhanced connections, forming a neural code, which repre-
sents a meme complex, i.e., information that is connected and potentially 
processed as a unit. Such neural codes may be represented as binary codes 
(Lin, Osan & Tsien, 2006; Tsien, 2007).
How exactly is a meme reinforced or attenuated in the brain?  Kandel 
described a sequence of events in long term memory formation. With 
repeated stimulus of a neuron, a sequence of chemical reactions causes 
gene activation in the nucleus of the neuron, resulting in release of mes-
senger RNA in a dormant form. Further stimulation of the neuron causes 
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a prion-like protein, CPEB (cytoplasmic polyadenylation element-binding 
protein), which is present in all synapses, to become activated (to an infec-
tious form), which in turn activates the dormant messenger RNA, which in 
turn makes protein to form a new synapse. The prion-like infectious form 
of CPEB infects adjacent CPEB, and thus perpetuates itself and the protein 
synthesis, maintaining and re-enforcing the new synaptic connection  (Kan-
del, 2006). In higher organisms, the stimulus that reaches a neuron resulting 
in this series of events is itself modified in several interneurons which have 
their own connections, i.e., stimulus (perception) is modified by existing 
memory (memes). Furthermore, neurons are capable of generating impulses 
without external stimulus, which may stimulate and reinforce connected 
neural clusters (memes). 
Originally, Dawkins pointed out that memes are replicated in the brains 
of those who imitate. As these replications are not always exact, memes 
undergo Darwinian natural selection and evolution as they are copied from 
brain to brain. How about the memes within the brain?
Edelman described Darwinian natural selection of certain clusters of 
reinforced neurons in the brain in somatic time (Edelman, 1987). Neuronal 
groups may be reinforced by signals  from other similarly firing neuronal 
groups ( forming memes) and thus gain survival advantage. One might say 
that neurons thrive on memes. When a competing meme becomes domi-
nant, neural clusters underlying it are enhanced, i.e., better fed, with more 
synapses. Thus, some memes will become dominant with repeated exposure 
and rehearsal and proliferate, i.e., recruit other neuronal groups; others will 
become dormant, not forming new connections or recruiting others. The 
process of reinforcement resulting in new parallel connections may be seen 
to be a process of replication of the meme, a prion-like replication by con-
tact through synaptic and/or dendritic connection. This is not to imply that 
one neuron serves only one meme. In fact, a neuron has many connections 
and may be a component of a number of different memes and memetic 
connections. Meme replication in the brain, therefore, does not involve 
reproducing new neurons, but rather occurs through recombination of 
component memes in existing neuronal groups. Such replication may occur 
through meme-processing mechanisms such as cognition, often stimulated 
by the entry of new memes into the brain.
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4. Cognition as Meme Processing   
When a problem is perceived, that perception arouses interconnected 
memes which may be in some way related to or resembles it, be it temporal, 
sonic, visual, semantic, or symbolic way. Then, the problem is recognized, a 
process of meme manipulation occurs to deal with it – the process of cogni-
tion.
Cognition is one of the brain’s activity of processing memes. This may 
involve comparing new memes with existing ones, juggling existing memes 
to make way for new memes, rearranging memes by combining or breaking 
down memes and reassembling them. The brain may also absorb and pro-
cess memes without cognition, e.g., empathy arising through mirror neurons 
(Agnew, Bhakoo & Puri, 2007; Craighero, Metta, Sandini, et al, 2007; Gaz-
zola, Aziz-Zadeh & Keysers, 2006; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), dreams, 
etc.(Agnew, Bhakoo & Puri, 2007; Craighero, Metta, Sandini, et al, 2007; 
Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh & Keysers, 2006; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) 
The brain, in my view, is more like the internet than a computer, with 
redundant storage and constantly changing connections and storage, in 
which memes are constantly created, propagated, combined, disintegrated, 
mutated, and evolved. Like the internet, there are many interconnected pro-
cessing centers that execute these functions. Some of these functions may 
involve a threshold number of processing units and reach consciousness, 
others without reaching consciousness. Just like information on the Internet, 
some memes stay dormant and others become activated and replicated.
Dreaming may be an important meme-processing brain state. Visual 
dreams occur mostly during the rapid eye movement sleep (REM), during 
which there is autonomic arousal and motor inhibition. During this period, 
impulses arising from brain stem (PGO spikes) reach sensory and associa-
tion cortex through the thalamus. Winson postulates that REM might be 
like off-line processing in computers. In this model, the task of associating 
recent events to past memories is accomplished while the animal is asleep. 
This spares the frontal cortex from having to process new information and 
integrating it simultaneously, allowing a more leisurely integration during 
sleep (Winson, 1985). 
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Reiser postulates that these impulses will readily activate neural circuits 
with relatively low excitatory thresholds, i.e., those circuits that retained 
memories of meaningful experiences to which emotions are attached and 
connected to current life problem (Reiser, 1990). These circuits would be 
those that represent significant memes stored during the day. During dream-
ing, then, the newly introduced memes may find new connections with 
already stored memes, and  combine with some forming new memeplexes, 
and may awaken others from a dormant state, or may become dormant or 
be simply discarded.
In dreaming state, existing memes may find connections with  newly 
introduced memes or with each other, becoming potentiated and reach con-
sciousness. Thus, in dreams, we may have a glimpse of the memes strug-
gling with each other, constantly making and breaking new alliances, con-
figurations, and reproductions within our brain.
5. Environment affects Genes through Memes
It is widely accepted that genes play an important role in mental health 
and illness. As an example, a single gene that codes for the vulnerability to 
multiple psychiatric (and medical) conditions is the serotonin transporter 
gene (SERT) and its promoter region polymorphism (5-HTTLPR). SERT 
is highly evolutionarily conserved and regulates the entire serotoninergic 
system and its receptors via modulation of extracellular fluid serotonin 
concentrations. 5-HTTLPR polymorphism consists of short (s) and long (l) 
alleles, and the presence of the short allele tends to reduce the effectiveness 
and efficiency of SERT. The short allele has been identified as an underly-
ing variation for the risk for anxiety,  increased neuroticism scales, neuroti-
cism, smoking behavior and difficulty in quitting smoking, negative mood, 
social behavior, social phobia, major depression, and irritable bowel syn-
drome (Hu et al., 2000; Lerman et al., 2000; Lotrich and Pollock, 2004; Yeo 
et al., 2004). Why does a single gene code for so many vulnerabilities? One 
simple answer may be that the gene codes for one or more basic evolution-
arily adaptive predispositions that, in combination with other factors, may 
determine the risk for a syndrome. When we look at the list of vulnerabili-
ties above, it seems clear that there is a continuum, from anxiety to adap-
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tive/maladaptive behavior to phobia to major depression, and/or to physical 
symptoms. 
Pezawas et al. (2005) showed that the short allele carriers show reduced 
gray matter in limbic regions critical for processing of negative emotion, 
particularly perigenual cingulate and amygdala. Functional MRI stud-
ies of fearful stimuli show a tightly coupled feedback circuit between the 
amygdala and the cingulate, implicated in the extinction of negative affect. 
Short allele carriers showed relative uncoupling of this circuit and the mag-
nitude of coupling inversely predicted almost 30% of variation in tempera-
mental anxiety. They also show increased amygdala activation to fearful 
stimuli (Bertolino et al., 2005; Hariri et al., 2002). Thus, this gene seems 
to increase the affected individual’s brain’s sensitivity to negative affect 
and anxiety (Gross and Hen, 2004). However, not all short allele carriers 
develop depression.
Caspi et al. (2002, 2003) have shown, in an elegant longitudinal study, 
that stress during the most recent 2 years in adulthood and maltreatment 
in childhood interacted with the 5-HTTLPR status. Individuals with two 
copies of the short allele who also had the stressors had greatest amount of 
depressive symptoms and suicidality than heterozygous individuals, and 
those with only the long alleles had the least amount of depression.  
Studies in monkeys have shown that the anxiety-enhancing effect of the 
short allele is mitigated with good mothering in infancy (Barr et al., 2004; 
Suomi, 2003, 2005).
Thus, 5-HTTLPR short allele, in conjunction with childhood stress, con-
fers an individual with the trait to respond to later stress with increased 
anxiety, which, in turn, predisposes the individual for later major depres-
sion, suicidality, and psychophysiologic disorders (Caspi, Hariri, Holmes, et 
al, 2010; Sugden, Arseneault, Harrington, et al, 2010; Uher, Caspi, Houts, et 
al, 2011). Other gene–environment interactions predisposing to trait and dis-
order have been reported, including type 4 dopamine receptor gene (D4DR) 
and novelty seeking and ADHD (Ebstein et al., 1997; Keltikangas-Jarvinen 
et al., 2003), monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) and antisocial personality 
(Caspi et al., 2002; Craig, 2005), and dopamine transporter gene (DAT1) 
and ADHD (Brookes et al., 2006). FKBP5 polymorphism (a glucocorticoid 
receptor-regulating gene) has also been shown to interact with childhood 
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abuse in increasing the risk of PTSD in an urban general hospital popula-
tion (Binder et al., 2008).
How does the environment and stress affect the genes exactly? The fact 
that a recent meta-analysis failed to show a significant interaction between 
the serotonin transporter promoter polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) and stress 
in the risk of depression (Risch et al., 2009) highlights that the interaction is 
not a simple gene × stress, but rather mediated by the individual traits and 
percepts. Except in a few extreme cases of physical stress, such as extreme 
heat or lack of oxygen, environment and stress affect genes only when they 
are perceived. As we have seen, the serotonin transporter promoter gene 
polymorphism may affect how the same stimulus may be perceived – as 
threatening or non-threatening, and this perception interacts with exist-
ing memories (memes) within the brain. This interaction may augment 
Figure 1.  Memes in Environment and Brain: Various memes that enter the brain 
interact with both genes and memes inside the brain resulting in epige-
netic changes as well as memetic evolution in the brain.
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Fig 1. Memes in Environment and Brain: Various memes that enter the brain interact with both 
genes and memes inside the brain resulting in pigenetic changes as well s memetic evolution in 
the brain.
Brain
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the stressfulness of the percept to be sufficient to turn on the gene, or con-
versely, the interaction may attenuate the stressfulness of the percept, thus 
not affecting the gene. 
When a sensation from a sensory organ reaches the brain, it is processed 
against existing templates formed by both genetic predisposition and mem-
ory, the output of this process constitutes perception. The templates and the 
percept are memes. Environment affects and interacts with genes through 
memes in the course of development, and mental health and mental illness 
are the outcomes of this interaction. See Figure 1.
6. Infusion of Memes from the Environment
The environment consists of memes and potential memes like a culture 
medium in a Petri dish. The culture medium consists of molecules, some 
of them nutrients, some of them toxins, and others inert. Some enter the 
organism and become a part of it or give it energy. Others may simply enter 
and stay without much effect. Under certain conditions, such as an increase 
in the concentration of the toxic molecules, some such molecules will pen-
etrate the protective barrier of the organism and cause a reaction in the 
host – perhaps an immune reaction that gets rid of the toxic molecule, or 
the organism may succumb to the toxin. The shape and nature of the toxic 
molecule play important roles in whether it enters the host, and what hap-
pens afterwards. So with memes. The shapes and other characteristics of the 
vehicles of memes are physical in nature
such as printed words, spoken words, melodies, rhythm, scenes, move-
ments, facial expressions, touch, etc. (Of course, memetic vehicles are 
themselves memes, and some memes represent physical objects, either con-
cretely or metaphorically, such as color blue, seeing red, etc.)
Memes contain various specific sensory components that can be identified 
and analyzed. For example, an unexpected good or bad news may be intro-
duced into the brain in different memetic vehicles, e.g., as a phone call, a 
letter, a news item on TV, etc, which cause different patterns and sequence 
of brain activation and thus affective arousal. Thus, the sound of a phone 
call may reverberate (replicate) repeatedly in the brain while a visit by a 
friend bearing the news may be soon forgotten. Stress thus may be defin-
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able through an analysis of the types and quantities of memes and their 
vehicles that invade the brain.
Memes are above all replicators. The invader in the culture medium anal-
ogy is a replicating virus. The stress memes interact with resident stress 
memes in the brain, which will tend to cause a cascade of stress meme rep-
lication. Counterbalancing this tendency is the host immune response, the 
negative feedback loop to amygdala from the cortex that may be effective 
in shutting off the stress response – if the protective memes are prepared 
and abundant. Chronic stress diminishes the number of hippocampal neu-
rons and causes an attenuation of the hippocampal dendritic connections 
resulting in a disconnection between long-term memory (resident memetic 
store that may attenuate the stress response) and current stress meme infu-
sion, a favorable circumstance for invasion of new memes. 
The arousal and activation associated with acute stress may create a con-
dition for heightened receptivity for meme infusion from the outside, while 
the deleterious effects of chronic stress on the brain serve to protect the 
stress memes from resident protective memes. Dormant stress memes may 
also be activated by the incoming stress memes, especially as the protective 
memes are attenuated.
Recognizing that memes are independent replicators whose only concern 
is replication of themselves regardless of consequences to the host organ-
ism may explain why humans are so prone to meme invasion and stress 
response. 
7. Pathogenic and Protective Cultural Memes
Culture, consisting of symbols –language, artifacts, rules, is a pool of 
memes. Memes enter the brain and take up residence in the brain. Endemic 
(cultural) memes introduced in childhood are strongly potentiated as they 
are repeatedly introduced during a period when the filtration system for 
meme introduction is immature. Eventually, early-introduced resident 
memes contribute to the formation and development of the filtration system 
which filters out new memes that may conflict with or contradict the pre-
existing potentiated memes.
Within the meme pool (culture) of most geographic areas, there are 
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memes for being “crazy” or “insane” as well as memes for anxiety and dys-
phoria. This is no wonder as many memes started out as imitations. Imitat-
ing the crazy one is surely the best way to be crazy, and imitating the one 
recognized as not feeling well is a good way of communicating that you 
are not feeling well. In isolated cultures, certain unusual (for other cultures) 
memes denoting such states have evolved, such as koro, latah, and ataques 
de nervios.
New memes or ways of expressing an internal state do arise and may 
become fashionable, such as some cases of fibromyalgia, “burn-out,” and 
multiple chemical sensitivity (Eriksen and Ursin, 2004).
As we discussed above, sustained stress, by attenuating the connection 
to memory and thus dominant resident memes, provides the brain with 
favorable conditions for new meme infusion. Such unchecked infusion of 
new stress memes may interact with dormant pathogenic memes hidden in 
the brain, stimulating their replication. A contributing factor may be that 
chronic stress causes sensitization to bodily dysphoric sensations (Eriksen 
and Ursin, 2004), which may in turn stimulate the pathogenic memes.
An example of such pathogenic memes may be depressive memes. 
Memes such as “I am worthless,” “I am a bad person,” “Nobody loves me” 
exist in many individuals, but are not prominent (reinforced) in everyday 
life. Such memes are not uncommonly introduced in childhood by adults, 
peers, and by exposure to persons who are despised (empathy is a form of 
imitation, and thus leads to memes).
Conversely, protective memes such as “I am loved (by parents, friends, 
spouse),” “I am competent,” and “I am good” are introduced to varying 
degrees during a person’s development.
Some of these memes may have been repeatedly introduced and were 
attached to positive emotions becoming a dominant part of the personality, 
others may have been introduced repeatedly but consciously suppressed, 
becoming attached to negative emotions, and may have stayed in a dor-
mant, repressed state within the brain. It is these repressed memes attached 
to unpleasant affect that chronic stress permits to multiply and reach con-
sciousness.
343Memory, Memes, Cognition, and Mental Illness – Toward a New Synthesis
8. Mental Health as Memetic Democracy
In the beginning, memes were obviously in the service of the genes - 
memes that elicited the pleasure experience were readily incorporated, and 
those that elicited the fear/punishment response were discarded. Memes that 
arose from individuals who were successful were welcomed as they prom-
ised pleasure. As memes became more numerous, and  became free-floating 
in books and electronic media, largely independent of the brain from which 
they rose, the link between memes and immediate pleasure or fear became 
largely uncoupled. 
Now in the form of information and knowledge, memes are to a large 
extent emotionally neutral,  neither pleasure nor fear. Thus, memes became 
independent of genes, i.e., memes that were indifferent or even hostile 
to genetic biological needs could thrive, especially when encapsulated in 
memeplexes such as doctrines, religions, and other -isms.
Modern human brain is immersed in an ocean of memes of all shapes, 
colors, and sizes, mutually compatible, incompatible, or indifferent. The 
brain is a Hobbsean universe of memes where each meme is out for itself 
against all other memes. It is natural, then, that some memes should form 
alliances with each other, and recruit other allies to form small cooperating 
societies, or memeplexes and complexes of memeplexes. Thus, small societ-
ies of memeplexes develop, and there may be tension, cooperation, or frank 
conflict among these societies of memes.
From early childhood, memes that stand for social norms, codes of con-
duct, and ways of relating with people, enter the brain. Some social memes 
are created by the brain through trial and error, e.g., the child learns that it 
is more effective to ask with a smile rather than with a frown. Such autoch-
thonous memes may be augmented by imitation of others, or may spread 
by others imitating them. The learning of morals and ethics may be through 
a combination of memes introduced from outside as well as trial and error. 
Some social memes, such as a tendency toward altruism, may arise from 
genes that have been evolutionarily selected sociobiologically (Wilson, 
1980).
During adolescence, there is an influx of new memes as the developing 
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brain has now gained the ability to abstract and to absorb abstract memes. 
There is confusion, conflict, and turmoil among the competing memes. 
Some already resident memes may be called to question by new incoming 
abstract memes. Eventually, one or more memes are identified as compris-
ing the essence of the self, the self plex, which are the memeplexes that 
have been successful in competing with others and established dominance. 
There are often more than one dominant selfplexes depending on the envi-
ronment in which the brain finds itself. For example, the dominant selfplex 
at work may be that of a “scientist,” while at home, it may be that of a “wife” 
and “mother.” At church, she might be a “Christian.” The selfplex(es) then 
rule over other societies of memeplexes within the specific domain. 
When the dominant selfplexes in different domains are in reasonable 
harmony with each other, they are called roles that can change smoothly 
depending on the setting. When a selfplex for a particular role asserts domi-
nance over others, for example, a religion, then there is potential conflict. 
Such dominant selfplexes often recruit self-serving memeplexes such as 
prejudice against others and chauvinism. Counterbalancing such memes are 
tolerance memes and freedom memes.
How the selfplex and other societies of memes should relate with each 
other is a meme itself, and has a number of variations. One model is that of 
an authoritarian and tyrannical regime in which one selfplex ruthlessly sup-
presses others. The self is, therefore, seen to be unitary and coherent with 
a strong identity, with strong support by prejudice and chauvinism memes. 
Authoritarian selfplex is subject to violent overthrow by the repressed 
memes and memeplexes if they are energized by an infusion of new memes 
or if the selfplex is weakened either by a decrease in brain function, or by 
infusion of conflicting memes.
An example of the fear an authoritarian selfplex exhibits toward new 
meme infusion is censorship. Individuals with authoritarian selfplexes tend 
to advocate censorship, for example of “bad words.” Of course, the “bad 
words” are resident in the brains of those individuals as memes; otherwise 
they would not recognize a “bad word.” And they are often preoccupied 
with the “bad words” and they look for them in everything they see or read. 
This is an example of the replication of the resident memes represented by 
the “bad words,” and how the authoritarian selfplexes are threatened by it.
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Another model of interaction of memes and selfplexes in the brain is that 
of an enlightened sovereign or of an oligarchy, where the selfplex maintains 
hegemony but is open to coexistence with other selfplexes and conflicting 
memes, and recognizes them as legitimate, some of them more so (the aris-
tocrats, so to speak) than others.
Yet another model is a democracy of selfplexes where there is recognition 
that different senses and objectives of the self can coexist, and depending 
on the needs of the genes and the environment, the different selfplexes may 
be elected to be dominant, with the consent of the ruled (Benjamin et al., 
1996; Cohen et al., 2005; Ebstein et al., 1996; Okuyama et al., 2000; Shirai-
shi et al., 2006; Van Gestel et al., 2002).
The memes within the selfplexes are not mutually exclusive, i.e. – some 
memes may participate in more than one selfplex. Just as an incoming 
administration in a democracy may retain some of the cabinet members of 
the outgoing administration of another party, newly dominant selfplexes 
often retain memes of a now nondominant selfplex. Furthermore, the 
memes that form the day to day working of the memetic government, like 
bureaucrats in a government, continue to function regardless of the changes 
in dominance of selfplexes. This model of memetic relationship in the brain 
may offer the most flexibility and least oppression. Unlike in multiple per-
sonality in which a repressed selfplex overturns the dominant one tempo-
rarily, in a democracy the change of regime is based on rational needs and 
is effectuated without suppression of the now nondominant selfplex.
In a memetic democracy, the selfplexes may be likened to major par-
ties that recognize the right to exist of the minor, even subversive parties. 
Thus, revolutionary memes and subversive memes, and even toxic memes, 
can exist in a state of check and balance, and may express themselves in 
accepted forms such as creativity and art. Freedom, tolerance, and openness 
memes are universally accepted by the competing major selfplexes. The 
brain as a well-functioning memetic democracy may well fit the bill for a 
model of mental health taking into consideration the gene x meme x envi-
ronment interaction.
The self is not a coherent and unitary entity, but an equilibrium of con-
stantly changing selfplexes in a sea of memes. The self is a fragile, uneasy 
coalition of memes that is subject to changes of regime and revolutions. 
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Mental health is a state of well-being of the gene–meme interaction in the 
brain. Such well-being is most likely achieved in a memetic democracy 
within the brain that recognizes both genetic and memetic needs, provides 
an orderly mechanism for their expression and mechanisms for adaptation 
to changing demands, and strives to maintain both cohesiveness and diver-
sity within the societies of memes.
9. Mental Illness and Final Common Pathway Syndromes
Mental illness ranges from universal unhappiness arising from the human 
condition to serious distortions of reality in the form of delusions and hal-
lucinations. Somewhere in between the two extremes is neurosis, a term no 
longer recognized by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the 
American Psychiatric Association, but is nevertheless descriptive of mild to 
moderate degree of suffering by afflicted individuals.
Neurosis, often manifest by moderate anxiety and/or depression, is gener-
ally considered to be a result of developmental hang-ups and faulty learning 
(Sadock, 2005). Any number of developmental theories, Freudian, Jungian, 
Eriksonian, etc., can provide clues to the repeated traumas and failure or 
inadequacy in mastering the demands of the developmental stage resulting 
in residual unconscious conflicts and faulty patterns of expectations and 
behavior.
Developmental task can be conceptualized as the integration of newly 
introduced and newly arising memes with the needs of unfolding genes. 
Neurosis denotes a state of the brain where the mutually incompatible and 
conflicting memes and memes representing genetic needs have not found a 
workable modus vivendi, where workable democracy has not developed in 
the brain. There may be an authoritarian brain state where a large number 
of memes that are potentially salutary are in a state of severe suppression; 
or a state of near anarchy where competing memes and selfplexes achieve 
ephemeral dominance.
Repeated exposure to fear and violence memes in childhood, when the 
meme-processing faculties of the brain are not fully developed, may render 
the brain susceptible to replication of these traumatic memes and further 
stunt the growth of the executive function. When any attempt at explora-
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tion and initiative is met with violence and trauma, fear memes and vio-
lence memes will replicate. When a revolution overthrows an authoritarian 
memetic regime, anarchy often results as the dominant selfplex did not 
condone the coexistence of a viable alternative selfplex to take over in an 
orderly fashion as in a democracy. The anarchy of conflicting memes may 
generate overewhelming anxiety, which in turn may trigger a gene-driven 
cascade of physiologic arousal into a final common pathway psychiatric 
syndrome.
These syndromes are serious conditions reflecting a pathologic brain state 
that, without treatment, results in an autonomous course and often chronic 
outcome. Schizophrenia, major depression, manic-depressive bipolar syn-
dromes, panic anxiety, and psychoses are the major examples of final com-
mon pathway syndromes. In all these syndromes, the meme-processing 
executive function of the brain is severely impaired, and thus general reduc-
tion in meme proliferation as well as directly gene-oriented therapy are nec-
essary.
10. Gene and Meme Directed Therapies
The recognition of gene – meme interaction and the role of stress that arises 
at least in part from memetic conflicts in mental illness provide us with a 
new perspective in therapy. Psychiatric therapy should be geared toward 
both genes and memes.
Gene-oriented therapy
This should take into account the epigenetics of the person, i.e., what physi-
cal and memetic stresses in early life caused which genes to be turned on or 
off resulting in the vulnerability to mental illness, and how can we reverse 
it? (Mehler, 20010; Tsankova, Renthal, Kumar, et al, 2007; Weaver, 2007; 
Weaver, Champagne, Brown, et al, 2005; Weaver, D’Alessio, Brown, et al, 
2007; Wong, Caspi, Williams, et al) Gene oriented therapy is not limited 
to drug therapy. In fact, there is evidence that a nurturing environment in 
adulthood and psychotherapy may be effective in reversing the effects of 
early stress on specific genes and thus the micro- or macro-morphology and 
function of the brain (Mehler, 20010; Weaver, 2007)
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Meme-oriented therapy
The recognition that memes interact with genes, and that memes are actual 
functional neuronal units that may have various components such as 
thoughts, beliefs, sounds, imagery, colors, texture, and emotions opens up a 
whole new world of meme-oriented therapies.
A. Broad Spectrum Meme-Oriented Therapy
In treating infections by microorganisms, broad-spectrum antibiotics have 
been particularly useful as they target a broad range of organisms. Espe-
cially in the case of mixed infections, they can be particularly useful. Simi-
larly, there are broad-spectrum therapies that may be geared to suppressing 
a broad range of memes. Of course, as in the case with antibiotics, broad-
spectrum memetic therapy may have the side effect of suppressing ben-
eficial normal flora of memes as well. Nevertheless, when the unchecked 
multiplication of memes may be overwhelming, broad-spectrum anti-meme 
therapy can be a very effective method of controlling the situation and pre-
venting an escalation of the memetic multiplication.
How can we actually achieve this? Antibiotics generally interfere with the 
replicative mechanism of the microbe. Memes replicate through signal rein-
forcement of the neural clusters that make up the memes and by recruiting 
other neural clusters through the development of new synaptic and dendritic 
connections. These old and new connections are enhanced by attention, 
affect, and thinking. Thus, depriving the pathogenic memes of attention, 
affect, and thought and thus the neural reinforcement would interfere with 
their multiplication.
An obvious approach is pharmacological intervention, a direct suppres-
sion of attention and cortical activity. It is well known that most mental 
illness is associated with insomnia and the promotion of sleep with drugs 
have beneficial effects  (Wichniak A 2012). Many tranquilizers, especially 
benzodiazepines, induce drowsiness and reduced attention. Antipsychotic 
drugs and  antidepressants are often chosen for the “side effect” of sedation 
as well as for the specific action. Many patients on these drugs also report a 
blunting of their affect.
There are a number of extant nonpharmacologic techniques that are 
349Memory, Memes, Cognition, and Mental Illness – Toward a New Synthesis
considered to be valuable in promoting mental health, but the reason why 
they are effective has not been clearly defined. They include such diverse 
techniques as relaxation training, meditation, hypnosis, bath, massage, 
music therapy, dance therapy, exercise, and bibliotherapy. In the light of our 
understanding of memes, it is clear that all these techniques have in com-
mon the focusing of attention on something other than the thoughts and 
feelings that are distressful, and thus the ability to suppress the multiplica-
tion of memes.
B. Specific Meme-Oriented Therapy
Existing formal psychotherapies including counseling are essentially 
memetic, i.e., memes are transmitted back and forth between the patient and 
the therapist through the process of talking. Psychotherapies work through 
meme manipulation in the brain of the patient.
Psychotherapy and counseling have nonspecific and specific effects. The 
nonspecific
effects have to do with the supportive presence of another human being, 
the therapist, who is interested and committed in helping the patient. The 
specific effects have to do with the particular form of psychotherapy and 
its presumed theoretical mechanism for helping, e.g., cognitive reframing, 
insight, or corrective emotional experience. It is generally recognized that 
psychotherapy and counseling work, especially in conjunction with medica-
tions in more serious mental illness, but it is not entirely clear whether the 
nonspecific or specific effects are more important in the effectiveness of 
psychotherapy, as the effectiveness does not seem to depend on the form of 
psychotherapy (Bergin and Garfield, 1994;Consumer Reports, 1995).
Nonspecific aspects of psychotherapy do have specific memetic effects 
including (1) the therapist is ipso facto a role model, a model for imitation 
in thinking and behavior, a source of memes; (2) during the regular therapy 
session, the patient feels protected and supported, i.e., the meme pool to 
which the patient is exposed is benign and protective, and may neutral-
ize the pathogenic memes in the brain; (3) rational and critical thinking is 
encouraged during the sessions that enhance the brain’s meme-processing 
abilities. 
I believe memes can serve as a unifying concept of all psychotherapies 
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and would lead to the development of new psychotherapeutic concepts and 
techniques. Currently, psychotherapeutic “schools” tend to be dogmatic 
about their particular theory and emphasis. Thus, the therapist is either 
a cognitive–behavioral therapist or a psychodynamic psychotherapist. 
Though emotions and behavior can be observed and explained in either 
terminology, there is no common value-neutral terminology. Memes can 
provide that terminology which bridges cognitive, behavioral, psychody-
namic, and neurobiological phenomena. A general understanding of chemi-
cal phenomena became only possible with the discovery of the atoms and 
their components, the protons, electrons, and neutrons. Until then, there was 
nothing in common between hydrogen, lithium, and sodium. Now we know 
that having only one electron in the outer shell, these elements have in com-
mon certain chemical properties such as being unstable in their elementary 
forms.
All psychotherapies, to a varying degree, attempt to identify pathogenic 
memes, trace their origins, and neutralize them and build a salutary self-
plex. Regardless of the brand, the nonspecific effect of providing a memetic 
source (identification figure) is an important ingredient of effectiveness. 
Novel therapies may be developed utilizing direct meme infusion and 
meme neutralization. Virtual reality populated by specific memes may 
produce an environment in which a patient’s pathogenic memes may be 
neutralized and protective memes may be augmented. Use of avatars, rep-
resentations of oneself in virtual reality, may be an excellent meme-directed 
therapy (Bailenson, Yee, Blascovich, et al., 2008).
Prevention plays an important role in the gene x meme x environment 
interaction model of mental health and illness. Early nurturance provides 
protective memetic environment for children, and tends to turn off vulner-
ability genes. Childhood abuse and adversity introduce pathogenic memes 
to young brains as well as turning on vulnerability genes. Education of 
children  in meme filtering and meme processing abilities including criti-
cal thinking and coping skills training as well as in broad spectrum meme 
attenuation techniques such as relaxation, music, and exercise, are impor-
tant preventive measures.
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